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RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT THE PRETRIAL
MENTAL EXAMINATION OF AN ACCUSED
In United States v. Wade,' the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a criminal case enjoys the right to counsel at a postindictment lineup. The Court found that certain police practices were
sufficiently suggestive to taint the credibility of an identifying witness
and that counsel's ability to discredit a mistaken identification effectively hinged on his knowledge of the methods employed by the police.
Consequently, a post-indictment lineup was a "critical stage of the
prosecution," 2 at which the sixth amendment mandates the presence
of counsel to preserve the accused's right to a fair trial.'
The Wade holding provided the basis for the petitioner's argument in Thornton v. Corcoran,4 that counsel is similarly required at
pretrial mental examinations. Charged with the rape of an eleven
year old girl, Thornton requested a mental examination. 5 When District Court Judge Corcoran refused to order Saint Elizabeths Hospital
(a federal institution) to permit attendance of Thornton's counsel and
privately retained psychiatrist at the hospital staff conference,0
Thornton petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Corcoran to fulfill his "duty." '
Chief Judge Bazelon, writing for the majority, denied mandamus because the "extraordinary writ" 8 could only be issued in exceptional
circumstances not present in this case; ' but he discussed the merits of
'388 U.S. 218 (1967).
2

Id. at 237.

3See 388 U.S. at 226-27 (1967). For a more complete discussion of the Wade
rule, see Comment, Right to Counsel at Scene-of-the-Crime Identifications, 117 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 916, 916-19 (1969).
4407 F2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

5The examination was requested under D.C. CoDE ANN. §24-301(a) (1967). 407
F2d at 696.
I Both petitioner's competency to stand trial and his mental status at the time of
the crime were to be determined at the staff conference. 407 F.2d at 696.
7Id. at 698.
8Id.at 697.
9 The court relied heavily on Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967), in which
the Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit which granted mandamus. After discussing the extraordinary nature of
mandamus when directed against judges and the exceptional circumstances required
to justify the writ, the Court reversed because no evidence of such circumstances
appeared in either the trial record or the circuit court's opinion.
Will is distinguishable from Thornton since it was the government which petitioned for mandamus in the former, thereby injecting the additional issues regarding
double jeopardy and the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Judge Bazelon recognized
but discounted the distinction, stating that the Will opinion "must chill the enthusiasm
of any intermediate court to issue such an extraordinary writ in any criminal case."
407 F.2d at 697. Instead, he proceeded to examine at length the merits of petitioner's
constitutional claim, ostensibly to meet the Will requirement for "findings of fact by the
(448)

1970] RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PRETRIAL MENTAL EXAMINATION

449

the constitutional claim nonetheless.1
Judge Bazelon began with a comparison of the psychiatric examination to simpler scientific, evidentiary tests-such as fingerprinting
or blood sampling-to which the Wade mandate does not apply, because
counsel's presence during administration of the test is unnecessary to
assure meaningful cross-examination at trial. He found that, unlike
these simpler tests, "there is at best small agreement among experts
concerning either the theory or technique appropriate to the diagnosis
of mental illness." " He went on to discuss the danger that an accused
will incriminate himself during a psychiatric examination; 12 the argument that the intimacy necessary to a psychiatric examination would
be disrupted by the presence of a third party; 13 the insubstantiality
of this argument as applied to staff conferences;14 and the problems
faced by attorneys unfamiliar with the nuances of psychiatry and
confronted with hospitals not eager to provide reports and files relevant
to the examination." Although not detailed, Judge Bazelon's discussion touched on nearly all of the issues pertinent to counsel's presence
at the examination; much of what follows in this Comment is a closer
look at several of these issues.
The Supreme Court in Wade described a critical stage as "any
stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out," 10 where
issuing court and some statement of the court's legal reasoning."

Id. at 698, citing

389 U.S. at 107.
Yet, even under Will, the court was not obliged to discuss the merits of the
petitioner's constitutional claim. Will dealt specifically with a court which had issued
the extraordinary writ; in Thornton the writ was denied. Regardless of the patent
desirability of explicitly reasoned opinions, a refusing court is not under the same
obligation to explain itself as an issuing court.
10 judge Burger (now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States)
strongly dissented from this approach, finding Judge Bazelon's discussion of the merits
of the constitutional claim "totally dicta." 407 F2d at 704. Judge Burger raised the
most frequently advanced arguments against permitting counsel to attend the psychiatric examination: that the examination is not a confrontation of the accused at a
critical stage of the prosecution but is rather a fact-finding process, id. at 711, and that
the intimacy necessary for a successful examination would be disturbed by the
intrusion of a third party, whose very presence in the person of counsel would transform
the examination into an adversary proceeding. Id. His arguments are buttressed by
the weight of authority. See, e.g., United States v. Albright, 388 F2d 719, 726 (4th
Cir. 1968) (presence of third party in legal and non-medical capacity would severely
limit the efficacy of the examination); Timmons v. Peyton, 240 F. Supp. 749, 753
(E.D. Va. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 360 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1966) (state mental
institutions cannot by the presence of attorneys be thwarted in their efforts to accomplish the purpose of intelligent examinations) ; In re Spencer, 63 Cal. 2d 400, 406 P2d
33, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1965) (presence of counsel not constitutionally required so long
as defendant is represented by counsel, and testimony of examining psychiatrist at trial
is not considered as evidence of guilt) ; State v. Snyder, 180 Neb. 787. 146 N.W.2d
67 (1966) (defendant who submits to or requests examination by court-appointed
psychiatrist is not constitutionally entitled to presence of counsel at examination);
State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to permit counsel to witness the state's examination).
11407 F2d at 699.
12Id. at 699-700.
13 Id. at 701.
14Id.

15 Id. at 701-02.
16 388 U.S. at 226.
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"the presence of . . . counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's
basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to crossexamine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of
counsel at the trial itself." I Thus the question arises whether the
purposes and procedures of the pretrial mental examination are such
that it should be characterized as a critical stage requiring counsel's
presence to protect the accused's sixth amendment rights."8
The defense, the prosecution, or the court may raise the issue of
the accused's sanity " to determine his present competency to stand
trial,2" his sanity at the time of the alleged crime, or both. Regardless
of whether the defendant seeks to establish sanity or insanity, he should
be informed of the methodology employed by the opposing psychiatrists
so that he is able to challenge effectively their conclusions.
The amount of time spent in active examination of the defendant
by the court-appointed psychiatrist varies greatly among jurisdictions. 2"
In the District of Columbia, defendants of questionable sanity who are
accused of felonies are sent to Saint Elizabeths Hospital, usually for
sixty days, for a determination of both competency and responsibility
for the alleged crime. 2 A psychiatric resident in training and a social
worker take independent case histories of the defendant, the former
immediately after admission and the latter within the first thirty days.
A psychiatric resident in training also conducts two or three thirty
17 Id. at 227.
18 Although apparently not raised by petitioner, Mempa v. Rihay, 389 U.S. 128
(1967), provides further support for his position. In Mempa, the Supreme Court held
that a criminal defendant is entitled to presence of counsel at a combined revocation of
probation and deferred sentencing hearing. The Court stated: "[T]he necessity for
the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case as to
sentence is apparent." Id. at 135. Since counsel's aid and assistance are also necessary
in pretrial mental examinations, Mempa becomes relevant because both parole revocation-sentencing hearings and pretrial mental examinations may be conventionally viewed
as outside the scope of the prosecutorial process, yet both may entail opportunity for
denial of sixth amendment rights of the defendant.
19 See JunIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CmCUIT, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH MENTAL EXAMINATION OF THE
ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES, BEFORE TRIAL 19-20 (1966) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL
REPORT] ; Comment, Commitment to Farview: Incompetency to Stand Trial in Pennsyl-

vania, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1164, 1174-81 (1969)

[hereinafter cited as Commitment to

Farview]. Several states provide for automatic pretrial mental examinations under
specific circumstances. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-2 (1963); MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 100A (1965).

20 When the defendant's competency is questioned, there is a danger that the
ensuing mental examination may actually be a search for incriminating evidence. See
Krash, The Durham Ride and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the
District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 911 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Krash]. The
danger raises fifth amendment problems which are beyond the scope of this Comment.
For an informative discussion of the question of self-incrimination and the admissibility
of psychiatric testimony, see Note, Pre-trial Mental Examination and Commitment:
Some Procedural Problems in the District of Columbia, 51 GRo. L.J. 143 (1962).
[hereinafter cited as
21A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INsANITy DEFENSE 132 (1967)
GOLDSTEIN].
22

27-34.

The ensuing discussion of the examination process is based on JuDicIAL REPORT
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minute interviews with the defendant and then submits summaries of
the interviews to the staff psychiatrists for evaluation at the staff
conference. Nurses and ward attendants send observations of unusual
behavior to the staff conference.'
The defendant takes approximately
five psychological tests during his stay. 4
A final decision on the defendant's mental condition is reached at
the staff conference. 5 In many cases a defendant speaks with a senior
staff psychiatrist for the first and only time at this conference, which
may also be attended by staff physicians, a psychologist, a social worker,
and residents in training." The staff members interview the defendant
for twenty to thirty minutes, and then privately discuss his condition
among themselves. From this conference emerges the hospital's official
diagnosis of the accused.
Diagnostic theories leading to official conclusions are, to use Judge
Bazelon's word, "legion." 2" In Martin v. United States,"' the defense
called four psychiatrists and the Government two. On the question
of the causal connection between mental illness and the alleged criminal
acts of possession and sale of narcotics, the defense experts responded
that the connection was: (1) possible, (2) probable, (3) a strong
probability, and (4) of necessity. Of the Government's experts, one
could form no opinion, and the other found "probably no connection."
It is unnecessary to question the impartiality of psychiatrists 2 to reach
the conclusion that an individual doctor's diagnostic techniques and
psychiatric school of thought undoubtedly influence his final opinion.
Thus, counsel's absence and inability to note the procedure followed
by the examining psychiatrist certainly "might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial" 80 by increasing the difficulty counsel faces
in attempting to refute the prosecution's expert witnesses. 31
23Such observations are usually insignificant factors in assisting psychiatric
determinations. JuDICLa. REPORT 102.
4 These tests include the Wechsler Bellevue Intelligence Scale, Wechsler Memory
Scale, Bender-Gestalt, Rorschach and Projective Drawings, and others. JUDIcIAL
REoRT 32.
A staff conference "is a quasi-formal review of a patient's status by the . . .
treatment staff of the institution." Commitment to Farview 1188 n.144.
28The hospital tries to limit the number of attending psychiatrists who might be
subpoenaed to testify at trial. JUDICIAL REPORT 33.
27407 F2d at 699; see GOLDSTEI 133:

An impartial expert, and the added credibility he brings with him, could be justified only if there was a high degree of consensus among psychiatrists on the
answers to questions likely to arise in the courtroom, on the qualifications of
persons competent to present such answers and on the techniques to be used at the
various stages of the examination. No such consensus can be said to exist.
28284 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
29 See generally GOLDSTEn" 133.
30 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
31 Cf. Henderson v. United States, 360 F2d 514, 520-21 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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The usual response to this argument is that the accused is adequately protected by his counsel's ability to obtain reports from the
examining psychiatrists. But as Judge Bazelon pointed out:
[T]he hospital [Saint Elizabeths] has not displayed an enthusiasm to make such reports available to the defense. As
psychiatrist
recently as last year it refused to allow a defense
32
access to the reports of its staff psychologist.

Furthermore, when reports are made available, they are often so conclusory as to be uninformative. 3 For example, in Calloway v. United
States,34 the report read:
Psychiatric examination reveals this patient to be sane,
competent and capable of participating in his own defense.
He may be returned to the Court at any time.35
Such reports obviously provide "no basis for knowing the standard
applied by the psychiatrist or the factors taken into account by him in
reaching his conclusion that the defendant is or is not fit to stand
trial." 36
Many reports are incomplete as well as uninformative since some
hospitals do not record dissenting views to the final submitted report.
Further, some psychiatrists, wishing to avoid court appearances, have
been unwilling to submit detailed reports which might become provender for subsequent legal attack. 3 Thus, in many cases, the hospital's report is of little value to defense counsel.
The need for defense scrutiny of the diagnostic process is increased
by another practice of some examining psychiatrists:
It has been suggested that with a broadening in the standard
of criminal responsibility [in the District of Columbia due to
the decision in Durham v. United States 38] there is less incentive for a psychiatrist to submit an evaluation that suggests (or concludes) that the accused is incompetent to stand
trial. The reason is that the psychiatrist can be reasonably
certain that the accused ultimately will be returned to the
hospital following an acquittal by reason of insanity. If one
assumes an accused who medically suffers from a mental
32 407 F2d at 702.

83 See JUDIcIAL REPORT 36 & n.1, 118. This situation may have changed in the
District of Columbia. Judge Bazelon has on more than one occasion requested that
Saint Elizabeths Hospital return more detailed reports. Id. v.
84 270 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
35 Id. at 335.
3

6Krash 914.

37 JUDIcIAL REPORT 36.

3s 214 F2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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some cases be inclined to report that the accused is fit
stand trial and rely on the high probability that he will
acquitted by reason of insanity 9'
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Admittedly this psychiatrist's gambit is undertaken out of professional
concern for the accused, because treatment pointing toward freedom is
more effective than treatment leading to a pronouncement of competency to stand trial.4" Nevertheless, the risk exists that an incompetent, innocent defendant will go to trial unable to present adequately
a defense perhaps entitling him to acquittal.4" Because he is unable
to participate effectively in his own defense, returning an incompetent
to trial denies him his right to a fair trial.4' Consequently, counsel
should be aware of the reasons supporting a finding of competency in
order to protect the accused's sixth amendment rights.
Valid reasons in support of a finding of incompetency may also
impinge on the accused's rights to a speedy trial. Some psychiatrists,
again acting out of professional concern, will occasionally refuse to
declare a defendant competent regardless of legal criteria if in their
opinion he is too dangerous to be allowed on the streets, or may be
unable to stand the stress of trial.4" The resultant period of confinement frequently exceeds the maximum allowable term of imprisonment
for the alleged crime.44 If the accused was in fact legally competent
to stand trial, this extended confinement obviously denies him a speedy
trial.
Thus, inconsistent or contradictory diagnoses varying with the
psychiatric methodology employed, disregard for relevant legal criteria
in determinations of competency, and incomplete or conclusory staff
reports, indicate that counsel's presence may be necessary to enable him
adequately to conduct subsequent cross-examination. But however
critical to the defendant's case the examination may be, the question
remains whether it is a stage of the prosecution.
The Wade Court was concerned with situations in which "law
enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused
by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings ..

.

."

" Insofar as the

prosecution confronts the accused during a pretrial mental examination,
39 JuDicrAL REPoRT 45.
40 See Commitment to Farview 1170-72 & nn.37-39.
41 See JUDICIAL REPoRT 45-46. Psychiatrists at the Psychiatric Division of the
Department of Probation of the Courts of Common Pleas of Philadelphia reportedly
resolve doubts about competency in favor of competency in order to dispose of the
criminal
charges pending against the patient. Commitment to Farview 1181.
42
See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
43 See Commitment to Farview 1191.
44

See generally GOLDSTEM 125.

See Commitment to Farview 1165-67, 1194.

45 388 U.S. at 224.
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the examination to that extent becomes a stage of the prosecution.
In theory the examination is a discrete process, separate from the
prosecutorial apparatus. But in practice, most criminal defendants in
the District of Columbia are indigent and thus must rely on examiners
appointed by the court and provided by the state. 6 As Judge Bazelon
remarked, many of the examining doctors testify for the government
at trial."
Ideally the examining psychiatrists seek only an impartial
determination of the defendant's mental condition; but Saint Elizabeths Hospital, "within the executive branch of the Government and
manned by persons on the executive branch payroll," has more than
once been accused of being "government-oriented in its general attitude." 48 Additionally,

[t]he prosecution itself has increasingly taken the initiative in
requesting the court to order pretrial mental examinations,
particularly in capital cases. The government's primary objective, however, is not to establish the accused's fitness to
stand trial, but rather to gather evidence respecting the defendant's mental condition as of the date of the crime in
order to rebut any claim of insanity at the time of the offense
should such a defense be subsequently raised. 9
Thus, the pretrial mental examination can become a discovery tool for
the prosecution, jeopardizing the accused's privilege against selfincrimination if adequate safeguards are not established.50
Of course, not every mental examination jeopardizes the defendant's rights. Perhaps the most serious threat arises when government supported institutions examine the accused, find him sane, and
thereby either remove the last impediment to conviction or even
provide the prosecution with evidence necessary for a conviction.5 1
But even examination by private practitioners affords opportunity for
abuses of the accused's rights such as have been discussed above: and
although only upon actual testimony at trial by the psychiatrist does
the examination become an ex post facto interrogation,5 2 the examina46

See

JUDICIAL REPORT

17.

47 407 F2d at 699.
48 E.g., JUDicLAL REPORT 97.

49 Krash 911 (footnotes omitted).
50 In Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1965). the accused had
undergone a competency examination. At trial, the doctors testified on the accused's
sanity at the time of his alleged crime. The accused was convicted. Although the
Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction, the court indicated that the doctors' testimony
would have been admissible had they in fact investigated the accused's criminal responsibility even though the examination was ostensibly to ascertain present competency.
Id. at 407.
' See Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F2d 695, 699 (1969).
52In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Supreme Court defined
interrogation as a critical stage of the prosecution. Id. at 488.
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tion may nevertheless qualify (as when legal criteria of competency are
disregarded to the detriment of the accused's rights) as a "critical
stage of the proceedings." "
The most important traditional policy argument for excluding
counsel has yet to be discussed: that the intimate nature of psychiatric
examinations would suffer if third parties were introduced." State v.
Whitlow " is often cited in support of exclusion of counsel.5 6 The
defendant there requested the presence of his counsel at his competency
examination to protect his privilege against self-incrimination. In
refusing the request, the New Jersey Supreme Court did establish
extensive safeguards against self-incrimination during the examination.
Then, turning directly to the issue of counsel's presence, the court
stated:
Having in mind the nature of psychiatric examinations, the
usual necessity for an extensive interview between the doctors
and the defendant, and the safeguards now established against
use of possible inculpatory statements of the accused as substantive evidence of guilt, we see no absolute duty on [sic]
the trial court to permit the defense attorney to be present
with his client; the matter rests in the court's discretion. If
upon application by the State for leave to examine, defense
counsel requests permission to be present at the examination,
the court should require some showing by the prosecutor as
to the attitude of the psychiatrists about the presence of counsel. Of course, if there is no objection, permission should
be granted. (In such case, counsel should realize his attendance is in the capacity of an observer, not an active participant.) If, in their view, the presence of such a nonprofessional would hinder or operate to reduce the effectiveness of
their examination, or if they assert they cannot examine in his
presence, the court may in the exercise of its discretion exclude counsel from the examination. In this event, if defendant requests, consideration may be given to the feasibility of
53

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
The Supreme Court in
Wade used the term "critical stage of the prosecution" interchangeably with "critical
stages of the proceedings." Compare id. at 226, 237 with id. at 224, 225. The problem
with the former is the difficulty of determining before trial what actually is a stage
of the prosecution. For example: John Smith, arrested for drunken driving in a
jurisdiction providing for optional breathalyzer tests, insists on taking such a test.
Negative results will probably not be used by the prosecution at trial, and the test
would probably not be called a stage of the prosecution. Positive results will be used
by the prosecution, thus qualifying the test, although voluntarily taken, as a stage of
the prosecution. The "critical stage of the proceedings" formula avoids this problem.
,4 This argument was made by Judge Burger in his dissent. 407 F.2d at 711.
cases supporting this position, see note 10 supra.

For

55 45 NJ. 3, 210 A2d 763 (1965).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir. 1968) ; It re
Spencer, 63 Cal. 2d 400, 413, 406 P2d 33, 42, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753, 762 (1965).
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permitting such devices as recording instruments or the like
to be utilized at the psychiatric interview. In any case the
court should allow a defense psychiatrist
to attend the exam57
ination, if such a demand is made.
It is significant that the court referred repeatedly to the right of the
defense psychiatrist to attend the examination conducted by state
psychiatrists. If the presence of a professional psychiatrist is not seen
as a hindrance to the examination, then neither should the presence of
an attorney. The court cautioned counsel that observation alone was
appropriate. But an attending defense psychiatrist would not participate in the examination. It would appear that either the psychiatrist
or attorney present at the examination would observe only,5 and it is
unlikely that the examination would be any more disrupted by the
silent presence of one professional rather than another.
One further consideration favoring counsel's presence is the
possible beneficial effect attending counsel might have on the productivity of the examination. An emotionally overwrought defendant
(whether or not incompetent or irresponsible), committed to a large,
impersonal hospital for sixty days, may view his examining doctors
with apprehension. The reassuring presence of counsel could do much
to alleviate the accused's feelings of isolation and distrust, and in fact
contribute to the effectiveness of an examination otherwise hindered
by the accused's reluctance to respond freely to the psychiatrist.
Defense counsel should also be permitted to attend the staff conference. The contention that the presence of counsel would disrupt the
intimate doctor-patient relationship is inapplicable to staff conferences,
where, as Judge Bazelon pointed out, the defendant "faces a number
of staff members, most of whom he has never seen before." 51 On the
other hand, the problem of self-incrimination persists as long as the
defendant is being interviewed during the conference. After the interview, when the staff discusses and evaluates the defendant, counsel's
presence as an observer should in no way interfere. The conference
is the most important stage of a mental examination, because it is here
that the impressions of the examiners and the results of the psychiatric
tests are evaluated. Here, the dissenting doctors express their conclusions. Here, the defense counsel can obtain vital information without disrupting the doctor-patient relationship.6 ° Here also, the accused's immediate fate may well be decided."
57 45

N.J. at 27-28, 210 A.2d at 776 (emphasis added).
58 However, counsel might interfere in some circumstances: for example, where
the examining psychiatrist was pressuring the accused for details of the alleged crime,
and counsel feared that any resultant admissions might be used at trial in support of
the psychiatrist's determination of sanity. In any event, such interference would have
to be minimal.

59 407 F2d at 701.
60 See id.

61 Text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
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Judge Bazelon never explicitly recognized this right to counsel, but
he did state that
[t]he petitioner's claim that the logic of United States v.
Wade should apply to his staff conference at Saint Elizabeths
Hospital is therefore anything but frivolous. If his right to
cross-examine the witnesses against him can be protected in
no other way, his argument is of constitutional dimensions."2
With the effectiveness of the accused's right to cross-examine and his
right to a fair and speedy trial hanging in the balance, the court should
either permit counsel to attend the staff conference, or devise equally
effective alternatives to protect these rights.'
82407 F2d at 702.
6 The Supreme Court in United States v. Wade recognized that legislation could
eliminate the dangers inherent in a lineup and thus remove it from the "critical stage"
category. 388 U.S. at 239. If effective alternatives were constructed for mental
examinations, counsel's presence would be unnecessary. See Thornton v. Corcoran,
407 F.2d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

